Complex negotiations: dilemmas, compromises and common positions

1Dilemmas and acceptable compromises

Negotiators often face choices where every option has a cost: accepting convoy checks, limiting visibility, temporarily reducing an area of operation. A compromise is acceptable if it crosses no red line, respects the principles and is still better for the population than no agreement.

To decide: describe the options, assess the consequences for the population, the organisation, other actors and the future (precedent), then decide collectively, at the right level, and document the decision and its reasons. Also set exit conditions: when the compromise will have to be reviewed or abandoned.

2Negotiating at several levels

Lasting access is rarely negotiated in one place. You negotiate in parallel at local level (checkpoints, area commanders, community leaders), intermediate level (governors, regional commands) and political level (ministries, the political leadership of armed groups, influential states).

The risk is inconsistency: an agreement at the top that the field ignores, or a local concession that contradicts the organisation's position. You therefore need a written access strategy, regular information sharing between levels and a single spokesperson per counterpart.

3Common positions and access coordination

When several organisations work in the same area, a concession made by one quickly becomes a demand on all. Joint Operating Principles or common positions, adopted with OCHA or the access working group, set shared minimum conditions: no payments, no armed escorts except as a last resort, control of lists and distribution by the organisations.

Coordination does not mean negotiating together everywhere: each organisation keeps its mandate and relationships, but all avoid contradictory messages and share their analysis of access incidents.

4Protecting the negotiator and the organisation

The frontline negotiator carries a heavy load: pressure, threats, responsibility for access for thousands of people. The organisation must protect them: a clear, written mandate, no risky meetings without a security plan, rotation of negotiators, debriefing after every difficult meeting, psychological support.

Threats are reported immediately to the security focal point and the mandator; they may justify a change of counterpart, negotiation level or posture. No agreement is worth the life of a staff member.

5Analysing a dilemma and deciding on a compromise: a structured method

A humanitarian dilemma is not a badly framed problem: it is a situation in which every available option has a cost for the population, for the organisation or for humanitarian action as a whole. Studies of practice, notably the Norwegian Refugee Council report Principles under Pressure (2016), show that the organisations that handle these dilemmas well are not those that never face them, but those that have an explicit, collective and documented decision-making process.

Seven-step method

1. Frame the dilemma in one sentence, with the two or three real options (and not one option and its opposite). Example: "Accept that the armed forces inspect the convoy and remove certain surgical medicines from it, refuse and postpone the convoy, or send the surgical medicines by another route."
2. Establish the facts available and what remains uncertain, with their grading.
3. Identify the norms at stake: humanitarian principles, IHL, organisational policy, red lines, commitments towards donors and the coordination system.
4. Assess the consequences of each option at four levels: the population (immediately and at three months), staff, the organisation (acceptance, reputation, compliance), collective humanitarian action (precedent, consistency).
5. Look for additional options: most dilemmas first appear as binary; the workshop must look for at least one intermediate or sequential option.
6. Decide at the right level, in line with the delegation matrix, after consulting those who bear the risk (national staff, partner).
7. Document and set review conditions: the decision, its reasons, the signals that would lead to revisiting it, the review date.

The option assessment grid

The grid is filled in with reasoned qualitative assessments (high, medium, low) rather than with scores added together: an option with an excellent benefit that creates a devastating precedent cannot be offset arithmetically.

A typical case: armed escorts

The IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2013) set out the rule: humanitarian convoys do not use armed escorts, except as a last resort, when cumulative criteria are met. These criteria concern the scale of the humanitarian need (lack of action would result in unacceptable human loss), the authority that would provide the escort, the actual effectiveness of the escort for security (without attracting more attacks) and sustainability (the escort does not compromise the future capacity to operate independently). The decision lies with the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team for the United Nations system, and with the leadership of each organisation for NGOs. It is time-limited and regularly reviewed.

A compromise that is acceptable today may become unacceptable tomorrow without anything having changed in the agreement: it is enough for the context to have changed. That is why every significant compromise must include a review date and written exit signals.

6The multi-level access strategy and the coordination architecture

A single organisation can negotiate access for a mobile clinic; it cannot, on its own, obtain the lifting of a siege, the simplification of a national authorisation regime or a humanitarian pause. These objects require a collective strategy, carried by the country's humanitarian architecture.

The actors in access coordination

The content of an access strategy

1. Analysis: access constraints by category and by area, the actors imposing them, trends over six to twelve months, measured consequences for the population.
2. Objectives: for example, reduce the average time taken to obtain movement authorisations by 50%, obtain regular access to three districts that have been inaccessible for more than six months.
3. Common positions and principles: minimum conditions, collective red lines (see next section).
4. Allocation of levels and spokespersons: who talks to whom, about what, with which message; rules for mutual information.
5. Mechanisms: humanitarian notification, incident management, access crisis cell, procedure in case of a payment demand or interference.
6. Advocacy: public and private messages, targets (authorities, influential States, the Security Council), timeline.
7. Monitoring: indicators, quarterly review by the Humanitarian Country Team.

Notification and deconfliction mechanisms

In several conflict settings, organisations notify the parties, through OCHA or the civil-military coordination cell, of the location of their fixed facilities and the routes of their movements, so that these parties take them into account when planning their operations. Three rules govern their use:

• Notification is information, not a request for authorisation: the parties' obligations under IHL apply whether or not notification has taken place.
• The information notified is limited to what is strictly necessary (coordinates, timings, type of facility), never beneficiaries or patients.
• Each organisation decides whether notification increases or reduces its risk in a given context: in some environments, notifying a facility may also turn it into a target.

Ensuring consistency between levels

• A single focal point for each strategic counterpart, known to all bases.
• A weekly 30-minute check-in between the access manager and the heads of base: agreements obtained, requests received, incidents.
• An escalation rule: any commitment requested at local level that touches on a higher-level position is referred upwards before being accepted.
• A cascade-down rule: any higher-level agreement is passed on to field teams with its exact conditions, and tested with a limited movement.

7Building common positions and joint operating principles

Joint operating principles or common positions have been developed in several crises where the proliferation of individual concessions was endangering all organisations. Their value lies less in the text than in the process that allows organisations with different mandates to commit to a minimum common baseline, and in the discipline with which it is applied.

The drafting process (6 to 10 weeks)

Typical content of a common position

• Foundations: humanitarian principles, IHL, commitment to work with all populations in need.
• Assessment and targeting: organisations conduct assessments themselves and define the criteria; authorities and parties are informed of the criteria and may make comments.
• Lists: no named lists handed over to the parties; sharing of aggregate data.
• Distribution and monitoring: under the control of the organisations; external observers accepted under defined conditions, with no role in selection or handover.
• Recruitment: according to the organisations' procedures; no imposed staff.
• Payments: no payment for access; taxes and fees only if they have a public legal basis, apply to all and are receipted.
• Security: no weapons in humanitarian vehicles and premises; armed escorts as a last resort in line with the IASC guidelines.
• Procedure in case of violation: possible coordinated suspension, mutual information within 24 hours, joint approach at a higher level.

Conditions for effectiveness

• Inclusion of national NGOs: they often face the strongest pressure; a text drafted without them will be unworkable.
• Genuine solidarity: a common position is only worth something if organisations accept a collective cost (coordinated suspension) rather than letting one of them give in.
• Dissemination to the parties: once presented to the authorities and armed groups, the common position becomes an argument ("this is not our choice, it is the rule of the whole humanitarian community").
• Monitoring of deviations: a confidential register of cases, discussed among heads of mission, without public denunciation.

The common position also protects the frontline negotiator: refusing on behalf of all organisations is less exposing than refusing on behalf of a single one, and the counterpart knows they will gain nothing by turning to the organisation next door.

8Worked example: the inter-agency convoy to Tal Varen

The context is fictional. Tal Varen, a town of 60,000 inhabitants, has been encircled by government forces for four months; the inside is controlled by an armed group, the Union des quartiers (UQ). The last convoy entered 97 days ago. A consortium of three organisations (a United Nations food agency, an international medical NGO and a national community health NGO) is preparing a convoy with OCHA's support. The available data show the price of wheat multiplied by six, 41 deaths of children under 5 reported by health facilities in one month, and stock-outs of insulin and antibiotics.

Step 1: sizing the convoy

The consortium decides to propose a first convoy of 20 trucks (food for about 12 days, the entire medical and nutrition component), followed by regular convoys, rather than a single convoy of 48 trucks that would be harder to get accepted and more exposed.

Step 2: the negotiation map

Step 3: the parties' demands and the decision grid

Step 4: the sequence

1. Weeks 1 to 2: agreement in principle at political level on both sides; adoption by the three organisations of a minimum conditions document signed by the heads of mission.
2. Week 3: intermediate-level meetings; transmission of the cargo manifest and route plan; notification of the movement through the deconfliction mechanism.
3. Week 4: an initial refusal by the commander of the last checkpoint, who "has not received the order"; the humanitarian liaison officer secures transmission of the order within 36 hours.
4. Week 5, D-day: inspection lasting 3 hours 10 minutes, seals applied, front line crossed; unloading in 6 hours into two warehouses run by the national NGO; return before nightfall, in line with the security plan.
5. Weeks 5 to 7: distribution to 11,800 households, consultations and nutrition treatment; post-distribution monitoring on a sample of 400 households: 94% received the full ration, no trace of organised diversion; three complaints about households left out, resolved.

What the case teaches

• Breaking the operation down into regular convoys made each stage negotiable and allowed trust to be built through commitments honoured.
• Each refusal was accompanied by an option that addressed the concern expressed (control, transparency, care for the wounded) without crossing a red line.
• The minimum conditions document prevented any one consortium member from agreeing on its own to distribution by the UQ, which would then have been demanded of all.
• The national NGO negotiator, the most exposed, was accompanied to every meeting inside the town and replaced after the third, following veiled threats.

An evaluator would note three pieces of evidence of quality: documented compromise decisions with their rationale, post-distribution monitoring data demonstrating the absence of diversion, and explicit management of the risk to the most exposed staff.

9Protecting the negotiator and the organisation: duty of care, compliance and reputation

Complex negotiations expose the negotiator to three types of risk: physical (kidnapping, assault, detention), psychological (chronic stress, moral dilemmas, guilt in the face of refusals) and legal (suspicion of collaboration, prosecution under counter-terrorism laws, accusations of espionage). The organisation bears responsibility for these under its duty of care, which case law has clarified: in 2015, an Oslo court found the Norwegian Refugee Council liable for gross negligence towards an employee kidnapped during a mission in 2012, because of shortcomings in risk analysis and management.

Protection measures, by stage

Negotiator stress and moral injury

Frontline negotiators frequently describe fatigue linked to repeated refusals, proximity to perpetrators of violence and a felt responsibility for the people not reached. The IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings (2007) and the Antares Foundation guidance on managing stress in humanitarian workers recommend an organised system: pre-deployment assessment, regular follow-up, debriefing, access to psychological support, workload management. Moral injury, meaning the suffering that arises from the feeling of having acted against one's values, is particularly present after a painful compromise: a collective, documented decision also offers protection by sharing responsibility.

Legal and compliance risks

• Sanctions and counter-terrorism laws: Security Council resolution 2664 (2022) introduced a humanitarian exemption into United Nations sanctions regimes, and the European Union has incorporated humanitarian exemptions into several of its regimes. National legislation and the clauses of funding agreements nonetheless vary: dialogue with a designated group must be approved at headquarters level and documented (humanitarian purpose, no transfer of resources).
• Aid diversion: any suspicion of diversion must be reported according to the organisation's procedures and, in most cases, to the donor within the contractual deadlines. Institutional donors require such reporting and value the quality of preventive measures more than the absence of any incident.
• Corruption: a payment "for access" exposes the organisation, and sometimes the negotiator personally, to prosecution, depending on the applicable legislation.
• Data: reports and profile sheets may be seized; they must be written factually and stored securely.

Protecting reputation and acceptance

A complex negotiation can be exploited publicly by one party ("the NGO has recognised our authority") or criticised by another ("the NGO is feeding the enemy"). Preparing key messages, deciding in advance who speaks, favouring discretion during the negotiation and factual communication afterwards, and informing the authorities concerned in advance of the rationale for the action are protective measures as much as communication measures.

No agreement justifies a staff member taking a risk they have not knowingly accepted, nor national staff or a partner bearing alone a risk that the organisation would not accept for its international staff.

10Common mistakes, contextual variations, interview questions and references

Common mistakes in complex negotiations

Variations by context

• Sudden-onset crisis: common positions do not yet exist; adopt a minimum baseline within a few days (no payment, no lists, no weapons on board) and plan for its revision at 30 days.
• Protracted crisis: the main risk is slow erosion; review every year all the compromises in force and their cumulative effect.
• Sieges and front-line areas: negotiations are political and multi-level; a sequence of small regular convoys is often more realistic than one large convoy.
• Urban: proliferation of small-scale armed actors; need for common positions that can be applied neighbourhood by neighbourhood.
• Remote management: dilemmas arise first for local staff; escalation procedures must be rapid and decisions owned by the level that holds the authority.
• Local partners with limited capacity: include them in common positions, provide them with legal and security support, and be willing to deliver the most exposing refusals in their place.
• Disaster in a conflict setting: combine the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the IASC guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in complex emergencies (MCDA), depending on whether the situation is outside or within a conflict.

Interview questions and elements of a strong answer

• "Tell us about a humanitarian dilemma you faced and how the decision was made." Expected: real options, criteria (population, staff, principles, precedent), consultation, level of decision, documentation, review, and what was learned.
• "Under what conditions would you accept an armed escort?" Expected: reference to the 2013 IASC guidelines, last resort, cumulative criteria, decision at the right level, time limitation, consequences for perception.
• "How do you build a common position among organisations with different mandates?" Expected: inclusive process, minimum baseline in observable behaviours, inclusion of national NGOs, dissemination to the parties, mechanism for monitoring deviations and solidarity in case of suspension.
• "How do you combine confidential negotiation and public advocacy?" Expected: complementarity and sequencing, assessment of the risks of public advocacy for access and staff, division of roles between organisations, explicit decision.
• "How do you protect a threatened national negotiator?" Expected: immediate reporting, reassessment, accompaniment or replacement, measures for their family if necessary, psychosocial support, and no pressure to continue.

Key references

• CCHN, Field Manual on Frontline Humanitarian Negotiation, 2019, chapters on the mandator, red lines and dilemmas.
• IASC, Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 2013.
• IASC, Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, 2008; OCHA, Oslo Guidelines (revised in 2007) and MCDA Guidelines (2003, revised in 2006).
• Norwegian Refugee Council, Principles under Pressure, 2016.
• OCHA, To Stay and Deliver, 2011, and Presence and Proximity, 2017.
• OCHA and University of Oxford, Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict, 2016.
• United Nations Security Council, resolutions 2286 (2016), 2417 (2018) and 2664 (2022).
• IASC, Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, 2007; Antares Foundation, Managing Stress in Humanitarian Workers: Guidelines for Good Practice.
• United Nations and NGOs, Saving Lives Together framework, revised in 2015.