Day 2: Preparing: context, iceberg and network of…

1Analysing the context and finding the island of agreement

A negotiation is first prepared with facts: who controls what, recent incidents, needs, perceptions of the organisation. These facts must be checked and shared with the team.

The CCHN suggests building an island of agreement: the list of points on which you already agree with the counterpart, often facts ("there are sick children in the village") and shared values ("children must not die for lack of care"). You start the meeting with this island, which builds trust, before tackling the points of disagreement.

Distinguish contested facts (to be clarified, without argument) from divergent norms (not to be debated head-on: you will not convince a commander to change their values in one meeting).

2The iceberg: positions, reasoning, motives

What the counterpart says is only the tip of the iceberg:

the position: "Nobody crosses this bridge";
the reasoning (the tactical why): "Enemy fighters are hiding among civilians";
the motives and values (the deeper why): the safety of their troops, their reputation with their superiors, the support of the population.

Do the same exercise for your own organisation. Negotiation moves forward when you look for options that meet both parties' motives: for example, crossing at a fixed time, with a list of vehicles sent in advance and a quick inspection, can address the security concern without giving up access.

3The network of influence

A counterpart is never alone: they obey superiors and are influenced by relatives, religious leaders, traders and the population. Map this network: who influences your counterpart, on which subjects, and what relations your organisation already has with these people.

Identify potential supporters (a community leader who wants the clinic back) and opponents.
Coordinate with other organisations (OCHA, access working group) to avoid sending contradictory messages.
Go through the right level: a problem raised by a guard at a checkpoint is often solved with their superior.

4Objectives, margins, red lines and fallback options

Before the meeting, write down with your mandator:

the ideal objective and the minimum acceptable outcome;
the margins: what you can concede (times, routes, prior information, lower visibility);
the red lines: what you will refuse whatever happens (an imposed armed escort, handing over beneficiary lists, payment, diversion of part of the aid, exclusion of a group);
your best alternative if no agreement is possible (another route, an accepted local partner, advocacy at a higher level, temporary suspension).

Also prepare scenarios: what will you do if the counterpart agrees, refuses or sets an unexpected condition?

In-depth course

Detailed methods, a complete worked example, tools, common mistakes and interview questions.

5Step-by-step preparation: timeline, roles and sources

Experienced negotiators generally consider that preparation is the bulk of the work: one hour of an important meeting requires several hours of preparation by the support team, sometimes several days for an intermediate-level negotiation. The method below structures this preparation for a significant negotiation (access for a new activity, lifting a lasting blockage, agreement on modalities with an authority). For a routine checkpoint crossing, it boils down to a quick-reference sheet.

Typical timeline for an intermediate-level negotiation

Timing	Activity	Responsible	Output
D-10 to D-7	Fact gathering: access incidents over the last 90 days, territorial control, needs, history of relations with the counterpart	Support team (liaison officer, security analyst, programme manager)	Two-page context note
D-7 to D-5	Island of agreement, iceberg for both parties, network of influence	Negotiator and support team, in a 2- to 3-hour workshop	Analysis tables
D-5 to D-4	Mandate sheet: objective, minimum acceptable, margins, red lines, fallback option	Negotiator and mandator	Sheet approved in writing (an email is enough)
D-4 to D-3	Consultation of peers and of the access working group; consistency check with other ongoing negotiations	Negotiator or access officer	Common position points to be respected
D-3 to D-2	Scenarios and rehearsal (role play with a colleague playing the counterpart)	Negotiation team	Scenario tree, key phrases
D-2 to D-1	Meeting security plan, logistics, interpreter briefing	Security focal point, negotiator	Movement plan, contact list, cancellation criteria
D	Meeting	Negotiation team	Notes
D (evening)	Debriefing and report	Negotiator and second	Report to the mandator

Sources for the context analysis

Access incident data: OCHA classifies access constraints into nine categories in its Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework: denial of the existence of humanitarian needs or of entitlements to assistance; restriction of movement of agencies, personnel or goods into the affected country; restriction of movement within the affected country; interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities; violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities; restriction or obstruction of access to services and assistance by affected populations; ongoing military operations and hostilities impeding humanitarian operations; presence of mines and unexploded ordnance; physical environment constraints. Using the same classification in internal analysis makes it possible to compare one's data with those of the access working group.
Security analysis by the organisation and by inter-NGO security forums where they exist.
Programme data: needs, coverage, results of accountability mechanisms and perception surveys.
Institutional memory: register of negotiations and previous agreements with this counterpart, earlier reports.
Open sources: public statements by the counterpart, local press, social media, communiqués from the armed group. Reading them reveals a great deal about reputational concerns and the vocabulary to use.
Informants: national staff, community leaders, traders, other organisations. Always cross-check at least two independent sources for any fact on which a decision is based.

Grading the reliability of information

A simple grid, inspired by intelligence analysis practice and used by many humanitarian analysis cells, separately grades the reliability of the source (from A, reliable from experience, to D, unknown or doubtful) and the credibility of the information (from 1, confirmed by another source, to 4, improbable). A "B2" assertion (usually reliable source, probably true information) can underpin preparation; a "D4" assertion must never be presented to the counterpart as a fact.

For every fact they will put forward at the table, the negotiator must be able to say where it comes from and how certain it is. A single inaccurate fact can ruin credibility built up over months.

6The CCHN analytical tools applied in detail

The CCHN Field Manual offers a sequence of tools for the negotiator (analysis of the context and of the counterpart), for the support team (network of influence and levers) and for the mandator (mandate and limits). The basic course introduced them; the aim here is to use them with the precision expected of an access manager.

The island of agreement: four boxes, not two

The common mistake is to list "points of agreement" vaguely. The tool distinguishes the nature of the element (fact or norm) and its status (shared or contested). Each box is filled in with wording that could be spoken in front of the counterpart.

	Shared	Contested
Facts	Convergent facts: what both parties recognise as true. The basis for opening the conversation.	Contested facts: to be clarified through questions, data or a joint visit. They are not argued out by force.
Norms	Convergent norms: shared values (protecting children, honouring the dead, caring for the wounded). The basis for the legitimacy of the request.	Divergent norms: not to be confronted in the meeting; to be dealt with over the long term or through other channels.

Practical rule: open with at least three convergent elements, clarify one contested fact at a time, and never put a divergent norm at the centre of a field negotiation.

The iceberg for both parties

The CCHN presents three levels: the position (what is being asked for, the what), the reasoning (the tactical arguments, the how) and the motives (values, interests, needs, the why). Two points mark a professional use of the tool:

You also build the iceberg of your own organisation. Negotiators often discover that their organisation's position ("unconditional access to all sites") masks negotiable motives (reaching severe malnutrition cases before the rainy season) that open up options.
You formulate several hypotheses about motives, with a confidence level, and prepare questions to test them during the meeting. The iceberg is not a certainty; it is a listening plan.

What principled negotiation adds

The Fisher and Ury method usefully complements the CCHN tools with three concepts:

The best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): what each party will do in the absence of agreement. You must assess it for yourself, but also for the counterpart: a commander whose best alternative is a discontented population and an empty hospital is not in the same situation as a commander who is well served by the status quo.
The zone of possible agreement (ZOPA): the space between each party's minimum acceptable outcome. If the minimums do not overlap, no interviewing technique will produce an agreement: you need to change counterpart, level, option or timing.
Objective criteria: relying on references external to the parties (medical protocols, Sphere standards, rules applied in other sectors, the practice of other organisations) to move away from a contest of wills. Example: "The Sphere standard provides for a maximum of 50 consultations per clinician per day; that is why we need two clinicians and not just one."

The counterpart profile sheet

For each important counterpart, the support team keeps a profile sheet updated after every contact:

Heading	Examples of content
Function and actual authority	Can he decide alone? On which subjects? Who can remove him?
Background	Origin, seniority, previous experience with humanitarian organisations
Communication style	Formal or informal, preferred language, importance of greetings, relationship with time
Known concerns	Safety of his men, reputation, resources, control of the population
History with the organisation	Agreements honoured or not, incidents, past requests
Sensitivities	Subjects to avoid, people not to mention

These sheets are sensitive data: restricted access, no storage on a personal phone, no transmission via unencrypted messaging, factual and non-offensive wording (they may be seized during a search or an inspection).

7Mapping and mobilising the network of influence

The network of influence is not an organisation chart: it describes who can shift the counterpart's position, on which subject, and through which channel. The CCHN distinguishes mapping (who influences whom) from mobilisation (how the organisation can, legitimately and transparently, draw on these influences).

Five-step method (2-hour workshop)

List the actors around the counterpart: hierarchy (superiors, peers, subordinates), entourage (family, clan), religious and customary authorities, economic actors, the population, external allies and adversaries, other humanitarian organisations, the media.
Score the influence of each actor on the counterpart for the specific object of the negotiation, from 1 (weak) to 5 (decisive). The same actor may be very influential on security and carry no weight on recruitment.
Score the presumed position of each actor on the object, from -2 (opposed) to +2 (favourable).
Score the existing relationship between the organisation and each actor, from 0 (none) to 3 (established relationship of trust).
Decide on an action for high-influence actors: inform, consult, ask for advice, request mediation, or simply monitor.

Reading the map

Profile	Interpretation	Typical action
High influence, favourable position, strong relationship	Potential ally	Ask for advice on how to approach the counterpart; possibly request an introduction or their presence at the meeting
High influence, favourable position, weak relationship	Opportunity	Build the relationship before the negotiation (courtesy visit, presentation of activities)
High influence, opposed position	Major risk	Understand their iceberg; seek to defuse their fears; never bypass them ostentatiously
Low influence, opposed position	Noise	Monitor, do not invest excessive time

Rules for mobilisation

Transparency: no manipulation, no hidden pressure. Asking a religious leader to explain the usefulness of a clinic to a commander is legitimate; asking them to convey threats is not.
Protection of intermediaries: an intermediary exposed as an "ally of the NGO" may be threatened. Assess their risk before approaching them and respect their refusal.
No humiliating bypass: going over a counterpart's head may solve a one-off problem and create a lasting enemy. When escalating to the higher level, do so while preserving the counterpart's face ("I understand you have not received instructions; we will ask for them to be sent to you").
Consistency: inform other organisations of the intermediaries approached, to avoid the same customary chief being approached by five NGOs with five different messages.
Do not create dependency: access that rests on a single person collapses with them. Diversify relationships at each level.

A simple indicator of the robustness of access: for each area, how many independent channels can the organisation activate in less than 24 hours to lift a blockage? A single channel is a vulnerability; three independent channels at different levels is a reasonable target.

8Worked example: preparing the resumption of the Moranga mobile clinics

The context is fictional. In the district of Moranga (about 95,000 inhabitants), the NGO "Secours et santé de la vallée" (SSV) runs three mobile clinics that were providing 5,200 consultations a month and following 340 children in treatment for severe acute malnutrition. Twelve days ago, Commander Barek, who controls the Tessaline crossroads on behalf of a self-defence militia, banned SSV vehicles from passing after a vehicle rented by another organisation was seen carrying a man wanted by the militia. Since then, 138 children in treatment have not received their therapeutic products. The rainy season begins in five weeks and will cut off the bypass track.

Step 1: verified facts (context note, D-8)

Fact	Source	Grading
The blockage targets all NGO vehicles, not only SSV	Two NGOs, SSV drivers	A1
The man transported was the brother of a driver from the other NGO, being taken to hospital	Other NGO, village chief	B2
Commander Barek lost two men in an ambush three weeks ago	Local press, informant	B2
Barek reports to the commune's security council, chaired by the mayor	SSV national staff	B2
Barek's wife was treated by the mobile clinic last year	Single informant	C3: not to be used at the table

Step 2: the island of agreement

	Shared	Contested
Facts	Children from the villages beyond the crossroads are treated by the clinics; the rains are coming; the militia has suffered losses	NGOs transport "wanted persons"; SSV does not control its vehicles
Norms	Sick children must be treated; the safety of residents is a priority; hospitality must not be betrayed	The militia's right to control who moves; the right of any wounded person, including an adversary, to be transported and treated

Step 3: the icebergs

Level	Commander Barek (hypotheses)	SSV
Position	"No more NGO vehicles will pass the crossroads."	"Immediate and unconditional resumption of all three clinics."
Reasoning	NGO vehicles are not checked; enemies can use them; he has lost two men	Children in treatment are at risk of death; access is guaranteed by the principles
Motives	Protect his men; not lose face in front of them and the security council; keep the support of the villages (confidence: medium)	Resume treatment for 138 children before the rains; preserve acceptance; avoid creating a precedent for patient screening

Step 4: the network of influence

Actor	Influence (1-5)	Position (-2 to +2)	Relationship with SSV (0-3)	Action
Mayor, chair of the security council	4	+1	2	Preliminary meeting at D-5 to present the proposal and ask how best to approach Barek
Chiefs of the four villages concerned	3	+2	3	Inform them; one chief agrees to attend the meeting
Barek's deputy at the crossroads	2	-1	1	Include in the proposed inspection procedure, so that he has a role
Imam of Tessaline	3	+1	1	Courtesy visit, with no explicit request
Other NGO involved in the incident	2	0	2	Coordination: it acknowledges the incident and agrees not to negotiate separately
Regional military command	2	-1	2	Do not involve: its intervention would humiliate Barek

Step 5: the mandate sheet

Heading	Content
Ideal objective	Resumption of all three clinics from the following week, with a stable crossing procedure
Minimum acceptable	Immediate resumption of one clinic for the distribution of therapeutic products, two-week trial period, followed by a review
Margins	List of vehicles, registration numbers and staff names communicated to the crossroads the day before; visual inspection of vehicles (no searching of medical records); fixed times of 7:30 a.m. and 3 p.m.; no passengers other than SSV staff; SSV-owned vehicles only, no rentals on this route
Red lines	No patient lists; no refusal to transport a wounded or seriously ill person whatever their affiliation, with notification to the checkpoint; no militia member on board; no payment
Fallback option	Distribution of therapeutic products by community health workers on foot via the bypass track, estimated coverage of 60% of children in treatment, impossible once the rains begin; advocacy with the security council

Step 6: the scenario tree

Barek accepts the proposal: rephrase, agree on a date for the first crossing and a focal point, inform the village chief present; report the same day.
Barek accepts but demands a militiaman on board: refuse (red line), propose instead the presence of his deputy during the inspection and a radio call on departure and return.
Barek demands screening of transported patients: explain the medical rule, propose notifying the checkpoint of a patient transfer without identity or diagnosis; if refused, consult the mandator.
Barek refuses everything: ask what would allow him to reconsider, offer to come back with the mayor; activate the fallback option the next day.
Tension or threat: end politely, leave, report; do not return without a security reassessment.

Outcome

The meeting, held at the house of the chief of Sarou village in the presence of the chief and Barek's deputy, lasted 1 hour 40 minutes. Barek agreed to the resumption of two clinics on a trial basis, with the list and inspection procedure, and at first demanded a militiaman on board. The negotiator proposed the radio call on departure and return; Barek accepted after a break. The third clinic resumed three weeks later. After six weeks, 97% of planned trips had taken place, with the average waiting time at the crossroads down from 40 to 12 minutes. All 138 children were seen again; 11 were referred for inpatient care because of complications.

The decisive point was not an argument but an option that met Barek's motive (protecting his men without losing face) without touching SSV's red lines: the inspection procedure gave his deputy a role, and the decision could be presented as his own.

9Preparing meeting security and the conditions for walking away

Any negotiation meeting with an armed party, a hostile authority or in an uncontrolled location is a high-risk movement. It falls under the organisation's security plan and its duty of care towards staff. Security preparation is not delegated to the driver at the last minute.

Checklist before a high-risk meeting

Item	Question to check	Responsible
Venue	Neutral venue or one accepted by both parties? Possibility of leaving freely? Distance from the base, alternative return route?	Security focal point
Composition	At least two people? Suitable profiles (language, gender, perceived affiliation)? Nobody exposed because of their origin?	Negotiator and mandator
Communication	Redundant means of communication (phone, radio, satellite phone)? Check-in call times? Agreed code words?	Radio officer
Cancellation	No-go and interruption criteria known to all (change of venue imposed at the last minute, refusal to keep armed men out, fighting reported, counterpart late beyond a set threshold)	Security focal point
Detention	Time after which loss of contact triggers the crisis procedure; who alerts whom; identification documents and proof-of-life information up to date in the crisis file	Head of mission
Documents	Carry only what is strictly necessary; no profile sheets, no beneficiary lists, no phone containing sensitive data	Negotiator
Gifts and hospitality	Organisation's rule on gifts (accept tea, refuse valuable gifts; offer only authorised symbolic items)	Negotiator

Defining the conditions for walking away in advance

The moment to leave a negotiation is decided before the meeting, not under pressure. Typical walk-away conditions are: a threat against a team member; a demand crossing a red line that is maintained after explanation; a change in the nature of the meeting (unannounced media presence, presence of a third party that exposes the organisation, video recording); signs of escalation (alcohol, weapons being handled, uncontained anger). The exit is always made while preserving the relationship: "Thank you for receiving me. I must report to my management; we will be in touch again."

A negotiator who fears for their safety concedes more, sometimes without realising it. Security preparation is therefore not only a form of protection: it is a condition for the quality of the negotiation.

10Common mistakes, contextual variations, interview questions and references

Common mistakes in preparation

Mistake	Warning sign	Correction
Preparing the position rather than the motives	The preparation sheet contains only "what we want"	Iceberg for both parties, hypotheses to test
Confusing rumour with fact	No sources or grading in the context note	Systematic grading, two sources for any decisive fact
Underestimating the counterpart's actual authority	Agreement obtained but then not applied at the checkpoints	Analysis of the chain of command; ask who needs to be informed of the agreement
Ignoring the counterpart's BATNA	Surprise at an "irrational" refusal	Assess what the status quo gives them
Not setting a minimum acceptable outcome	A mediocre agreement accepted out of weariness	Minimum written into the mandate sheet
Preparing alone	Cultural or political blind spots	Workshop with national staff, security and programme
Forgetting coordination	Another NGO negotiates the same day with the same counterpart	Systematic contact with the access working group

Variations by context

Sudden-onset crisis: preparation takes 30 minutes; use a one-page quick-reference sheet (facts, island, objective, minimum, red lines, fallback option, security), and complete the analysis afterwards.
Protracted crisis: preparation relies on history; keep a register of negotiations by counterpart, with commitments and whether they were honoured, to avoid renegotiating what has already been secured.
Camp: the network of influence includes committees and section leaders, camp management authorities and security; beware of self-appointed leaders who capture representation.
Urban: mapping is done by neighbourhood, even by street; economic actors (transporters, traders) are often more influential than formal authorities.
Remote management: preparation is shared between headquarters or the capital (analysis, mandate) and the local team (facts, network); plan a structured preparation call and a structured debriefing call.
Local partner: train the partner in the tools, let them lead the analysis of the network they know better, but share responsibility for red lines and security.

Interview questions and elements of a strong answer

"How do you prepare an access negotiation?" Expected: the sequence of facts, island of agreement, iceberg, network, mandate with minimum and fallback option, coordination, scenarios, security; mention of the time required and of roles.
"Give an example where you discovered a hidden motive of your counterpart." Expected: a specific case, how the hypothesis was formed and tested through questions, and the option that resulted.
"How do you assess the reliability of the information on which you negotiate?" Expected: cross-checking of sources, grading, caution with unverified facts, role of national staff.
"What do you do if the two parties' minimums do not overlap?" Expected: change option, level, counterpart or timing; mobilise the network; activate the fallback option; do not force an agreement beyond the mandate.
"How do you prepare the security of a meeting with an armed group?" Expected: venue, composition, communications, cancellation and walk-away criteria, detention procedure, documents carried.

Key references

CCHN, Field Manual on Frontline Humanitarian Negotiation, 2019, modules on context analysis, the island of agreement, the iceberg and the network of influence.
OCHA, Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework and its nine categories of access constraints.
OCHA, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners, 2006, chapters on preparation.
Fisher, Ury and Patton, Getting to Yes.
Global Interagency Security Forum, Security Risk Management: a basic guide for smaller NGOs, 2017.
Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI), Talking to the Other Side: Humanitarian Engagement with Armed Non-State Actors, 2012.
Sphere Association, The Sphere Handbook, 2018, health standards (clinician workload) and Protection Principles.

Preparing: context, iceberg and network of influence